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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of an increase in the value of the cash
transfer paid to families by the Brazilian Bolsa Família program. The ex-
istence of a similar program in the state of Ceará, Bolsa Cidadão, that in-
creases the value received by a sub-group of families, provides a unique
dataset, enabling us to evaluate the effect of a higher value of transfer on
the spending of comparable households. There is a significant increase in
consumption, but it is smaller than the increment in the income, suggest-
ing that the consumption of the households is not properly declared.
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Resumo
O presente artigo avalia o impacto de um aumento no valor do bene-
fício do programa Bolsa Família. Isso é possível pela existência no Estado
do Ceará de um programa semelhante, Bolsa Cidadão, que na prática au-
menta o valor do Bolsa Família para um destas famílias, possibilitando
avaliar o efeito de um maior valor de transferência sobre os gastos de fa-
mílias comparáveis. É observado um efeito significativo no consumo das
famílias. No entanto, a elevação é menor do que o incremento na renda, o
que sugere que o consumo das famílias não é corretamente declarado.
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1 Introduction
Bolsa Família is the largest conditional cash transfer in the world and it is now
a consolidated mechanism with favorable evaluations of its impact on poverty
in Brazil.1 The debate over its validity and effectiveness has been now directed
to its improvement and expansion. A simple but not trivial question emerges
from this discussion: Should additional resources be allocated to the program
in order to extend its coverage or to increase the value of the benefit?
The Brazilian state of Ceará provides a unique situation to allow us to
evaluate the effect of an increase in the value of Bolsa Família due to the ex-
istence of a similar and complementary program called: Bolsa Cidadão. The
state government transfers resources to its 41 poorest municipalities in the
state, where the poorest families receive a monthly stipend that is added to
the Bolsa Família. This program allows us to compare families in similar cir-
cumstances receiving Bolsa Família for different values.
To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use data of this type to es-
timate the effects of higher values of cash transfers on consumption of com-
parable units.2 It is important to highlight that, by performing an evaluation
under these circumstances, some of the most common and difficult problems
to resolve when dealing withmatching and impact evaluation are significantly
mitigated: self-selection and selection bias.
As in the Bolsa Família program from the federal government, Bolsa Cidadão
program unifies the actions of all programs of cash transfer existing in the
state. It is a benefit that provides an additional amount of cash to the recip-
ients of the Bolsa Família program, ranging from R$ 5 to R$ 25, which rep-
resented, on average, a 20% increase in the Bolsa Família benefit and 7.1%
increase in the initial income.3
In order to carry out the proposed evaluation, we use a dataset extracted
from the administrative file (Cadastro Único) provided by the Ministry of So-
cial Development (Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social — MDS) through the
Secretariat of Labor and Social Development of Ceará State (Secretaria do Tra-
balho e Desenvolvimento Social), which contains the information of all indi-
viduals enrolled in federal and state welfare programs.
In this official database are recorded information upon the family and its
members with monthly per capita income of up to half the Brazilian mini-
mum wage.4 Information included in the official database includes character-
istics relative to the household and the individual, such as educational qualifi-
cation, profession, income andmonthly expenses, amongmany other relevant
variables.
From this dataset we performed an impact evaluation analysis of the fam-
ilies that receive both the Bolsa Família and Bolsa Cidadão benefits, using the
methodology of matching with propensity score, in order to mitigate a likely
selection bias in the determination of the recipients of the additional bene-
fit. A statistically significant effect on the level of household consumption is
1Some of those papers are Resende & Oliveira (2008), Soares et al. (2009) and Duarte & Sil-
veira (2008).
2Filmer & Schady (2010) use a sharp regression discontinuity design to identify the effect of
higher values of cash transfers on school attendance in Cambodia.
3The average value received by the families in November 2007 was R$16.00 (About US$9.00).
For more detailed figures, see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
4Income per person at the date of inclusion in the program.
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found when the income of families who receive the additional cash transfer
and families who receive only the Bolsa Família are compared. However, the
increase in consumption is smaller than the increase in income, suggesting
that the consumption of the households is not properly declared.
In the following section, the program coverage is defined, as well as the
sample used in the analysis. In section 3, the methodology used is described,
while section 4 discusses the effects of participation in the program on con-
sumption. The fifth section concludes.
2 Sample Delimitation, Program Coverage and Descriptive
Statistics
2.1 Sample Delimitation
In the Cadastro Único database for the state of Ceará, there were more than
5 million and 800 thousand individuals in November 2007. In order to en-
able more consistent and reliable estimates, the dataset were constrained to
the entries updated between January and November 2007, in order to avoid
distortions, especially in monetary variables.5
When we also constrain the database only to people living in the 41 poor-
est municipalities where the Bolsa Cidadão was provided, the sample size is
reduced to 695.027 people, which represents 78% of the total population of
those municipalities.
Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the rates of inclusion in Cadastro Único
database, as well as participation in Bolsa Família and Bolsa Cidadão by munic-
ipality. The percentage of the total population in the official database is very
high. This is partially explained by the fact that those municipalities are the
ones with the highest social vulnerability in the state.6
2.2 Program Coverage
The percentage of coverage of the Bolsa Família is quite high, with most of the
municipalities with more than 80% of registered people receiving the bene-
fit. For the Bolsa Cidadão program, the percentage of coverage is not quite as
high, just over 15% in the 41 municipalities with recipients of this additional
benefit.
Table 1 presents the coverage of Bolsa Cidadão and Bolsa Família programs
in municipalities taking into account two criteria. The coverage with respect
to the total population of the municipality and coverage with respect to the
population registered in the Cadastro Único database. It is worth noting that
there is not a large reduction in the coverage of both programs when consid-
ering the total population of the municipality as a reference instead of the
5Another advantage of this approach is to improve the quality of information. As highlights
Loureiro (2007), the Cadastro Único Databasehas some difficulties that were progressively miti-
gated by MDS.
6It should be noted also that some percentages exceed 100%. There are at least two causes
for this fact. First, the values of population size are estimates, which may be underestimated.
Second, it is well know that in the Brazil, especially in the Northeast region, there are people
from towns of neighboring municipalities who seek to enroll in a different municipality because
the registration office is closer. In this situation, they either incorrectly declare that their town
belongs to a different municipality or simply lie about it.
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population registered in the Cadastro Único database. This indicates the high
level of poverty in these locations.
Table 1: Bolsa Família and Bolsa Cidadão Coverage in the 41 municipali-
ties
Bolsa Família Bolsa Cidadão
Total Population 890,926 890,926
People in Cadastro Único database 695,027 695,027
Population not receiving the benefit 133,580 585,219
Population receiving the benefit 561,447 109,808
Program Coverage (Total Population) 63.02% 12.33%
Program Coverage (Cadastro Único database) 80.78% 15.80%
Note: Information in November — 2007. Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Aiming a better understanding of the characteristics of people included in the
database in the 41 municipalities which have benefited families with the Bolsa
Cidadão program, some descriptive statistics concerning the households, such
as educational level, school attendance and condition in the labor market are
presented below. The following statistics are related to all families registered
in the database, regardless of whether or not they are receiving the benefits.
Table 2 below shows the school attendance of people between 7 and 17 years
of age who were registered in the municipalities under analysis. It can easily
be noticed that the percentage of people in this age group who is not attending
school is just over 11%. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that over 87%
of the students are enrolled in public schools, with the great majority of the
pupils attending schools under municipal administration. It is worth noting
that less than 1% of them are enrolled in private schools.
Table 2: School Attendance of the
population in the database between
7 e 17 years of age
School Attendance %
Municipal Public 81.50
State Public 5.69
Federal Public 0.01
Private 0.62
Other 0.15
Not enrolled at school 11.53
N/A 0.49
Total 100.00
Note: Information in November — 2007.
Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
Table 3 shows the distribution of individuals with respect to the situation
in the labor market of the population in the database in working age. More
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than 54% of the population between 15 and 65 years of age that are registered
in Cadastro Único database do not work. The second most frequent category is
that of rural workers, followed by to retirees and pensioners. It is also notable
the participation of people with formal employment, which reaches less than
1% of people registered in the database.
Table 3: Situation in the Labor Market of the
population in the database in working age
Situation in the Labor Market %
No Job 54.9
Rural Worker 31.1
Retiree/Pensioner 5.0
Autonomous 0.9
Employee with formal contract 0.9
Employee without formal contract 2.9
No reporting/Other 4.3
Total 100.00
Information in November — 2007. Data Source:
Cadunico/MDS.
Another important aspect regards the source of income (excluding bene-
fits) of households. Table 4 displays the share of each source of income among
the people included in Cadastro Único database, which shows that almost 50%
of people that have a source of income obtain it from labor. Note also that re-
tirement and pensions benefits are the other main sources of income.
Table 4: Sources of Income of
households in the database
Sources of Income %
Labor 49.8
Retirement/Pension 32.7
Unemployment Benefit 0.1
Alimony 0.6
Other Income 16.8
Total 100.00
Information in November — 2007. Data
Source: Cadunico/MDS.
As important as the information about the source of income of the poten-
tial benefit recipients is the destination of such income. Table 5 below shows
the destination of the expenditure of people in the sample, where the food
spending dominates the family budget, making up more than 64% of total
expenditure. The second largest expenditure of the families is cooking gas,
followed by medicines and electricity.
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Table 5: Destination of the Expenditures of
households in the database
Destination of the Expenditures %
Food 64.2
Rent 2.1
Housing Financing 0.2
Water 2.3
Electricity 6.5
Transport 2.7
Medicines 6.9
Cooking Gas 10.1
Other Expenditures 5.0
Total 100.00
Information in November — 2007. Data Source:
Cadunico/MDS.
3 Empirical Framework
In order to assess the impact of a family receiving an additional direct income
transfer, we restricted the sample only to families that are Bolsa Família recipi-
ents.7 Because this is also a condition for a family to receive the Bolsa Cidadão
benefit, this procedure does not eliminate any of those families from the sam-
ple. This procedure also significantly mitigates the problem of selection bias.8
However, even after that, it is still possible (in fact likely) that a family
will participate in the Bolsa Cidadão program if it has some specific charac-
teristics. In order to mitigate this problem we will use matching based on
propensity score in order to estimate the causal effects of the treatment. In
the present study, this method will be employed to evaluate the effects of the
Bolsa Cidadão benefit on expenditures of beneficiary families which comprise
consumption in items such as food, housing, clothing, education and other
expenses.
This impact is identified in the literature of impact assessment as Average
Treatment Effect (ATE). This concept emerges from a framework based on
the idea of counterfactual, where the impact of a treatment is evaluated by
comparing the effect of the treatment on an outcome variable between two
situations: the situation of an individual with the treatment and status of that
same individual, if he had not received treatment.9
Denoting the consumption of the families with the additional benefit by Y1
and Y0 the consumption of families without treatment, it is clear that a family
cannot be in both situations simultaneously. To measure the treatment effect,
we should look for the difference between results with and without treatment,
Y1 −Y0. Note that this difference remains a random variable. Considering the
7It is not unusual the situation in which there is more than one family in a given household.
In this paper, we use the two words interchangeably to denote the entity with a common head.
8This session is based on Wooldridge (2002, chap. 18) and Lee (2005). For a recent survey on
the propensity score matching literature, see Caliendo & Kopeinig (2008).
9The literature of impact evaluation is based on the seminal papers of Rubin (1974), Rosen-
baum & Rubin (1983), Heckman (1991), Heckman et al. (1997), Imbens & Angrist (1994) and
Angrist et al. (1996).
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average difference between the families under analysis, which may include a
set of covariates as controls (x), we have the average treatment effect:
ATE = E (Y1 −Y0|x) (1)
ATE is the expected effect of treatment on a family selected at random from
a population. A more common alternative measure in the literature would be
the average treatment effect in the treated (ATT), that is, for those who actually
participated in the program (w = 1, otherwise, w = 0). It is often denoted by:
ATT = E (Y1 −Y0|w = 1,x) (2)
Onemust bear in mind that those procedures are only valid under random-
ization and some other assumptions.10 In this case, a simple statistical test of
comparison of averages would be sufficient. However, as in the great majority
of the situations in social sciences, a randomized sample is not only difficult
to carry out, but very unlikely to be accepted by the candidate recipients or
policy makers.
In the present case, programs such as Bolsa Família and Bolsa Cidadão use
some specific eligibility criteria so that there is a selection bias if outcomes
between recipients and non-recipients are considered. Moreover, what also
usually happens is the phenomenon known as self-selection into treatment.
That is, individuals determine, at least partially, if they will receive treatment.
Nevertheless, because the criteria used are the same, and every Bolsa Cidadão
recipient is also a Bolsa Família recipient, most of these issues are resolved
when a comparison between these two groups is carried out.
However, it is still possible to argue that even in the case of comparable
households, some selection bias will emerge in the process of determination
of the additional benefit. In order to mitigate this problem, the propensity
score methodology is implemented.
3.1 Selection on Observable Variables: The Propensity Score
As mentioned earlier, in the case where participation is not drawn randomly,
a simple comparison between families participating and not participating in
the program could lead to misleading conclusions, due to, at least, two rea-
sons. First, ex-post differences of the results could simply reflect differences
that existed before the program. Second, the effect of the program may be a
function of background variables (education of the head of the family, number
of children, etc.) that may differ between treatment and control groups. These
problems can be mitigated by using the method of matching with propensity
score.11
To deal with the problem of pairing, Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) devel-
oped a method known as propensity score matching. These authors showed
that the matching procedure can be implemented through a single control
variable, the propensity score. The propensity score p(x) is defined as the con-
ditional probability of a family receiving the treatment given their observable
characteristics x. That is, p (x) = Prob (w = 1|x).
10In the case of a randomized experiment ATE and ATT are equal. For further detail, see
Wooldridge (2002, chap. 18) and Lee (2005).
11See Attanasio et al. (2004) to further details.
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Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) show that in equation 2, x can be replaced by
p (x), thus:
E (Y1 −Y0|w = 1,p (x)) = E (Y1|w = 1,p (x))−E (Y0|w = 0,p (x)) (3)
If the treatment and outcomes are independent conditional on pre-treat-
ment variables, these are also independent conditional on the probability of
receiving treatment given to observable characteristics, i.e., conditional on
propensity score.12
(Y0,Y1 ⊥ w|p (x)) (4)
However, as Rosenbaum (2002) points out, the propensity score methodol-
ogy solves only two of the three likely sources of bias in the estimation of the
ATT, the common support bias and the overt bias (generated by observed fac-
tors). A third source of bias, the covert bias (generated by unobserved factors),
may be reduced by this procedure, but not completely eliminated. As it will
be discussed, there are some reasons to believe that the bias stems basically
from observable factors.
3.2 Unobserved Heterogeneity: Covert Selection Bias
When we consider the existence of unobserved factors (u) influencing the
probability of being a Bolsa Cidadão recipient and we explicitly consider those
variables to each family i, the propensity score can now be denoted by:
pi = p (xi ,ui ) = Prob (wi = 1|xi ,ui ) (5)
That implies that two families with exactly the same values for the co-
variates x can have different probabilities of receiving the treatment. That
would be the case if, for example, families weremore likely to receive the addi-
tional benefit if they knew someone working in the municipal administration.
Rosenbaum (2002) showed that the ATT only maintain its causal interpreta-
tion if unobserved factors caused the relative likelihood of treatment to differ
between treatment and control groups with similar observed characteristics
by a quantity within reasonably high bounds.13 The analysis is performed by
expressing the treatment propensity in terms of odds. In the present case, the
odds of treatment are given by pi1−pi and inform the relative likelihood that a
family will receive the additional benefit. For two families i and j , the ratio of
their odds is given by
pi
1−pi
pj
1−pj
=
pi
(
1− pj
)
pj
(
1− pj
) (6)
In the present case, the odds ratio reflects the relative and ex ante likeli-
hood of treatment for an actually treated individual relative to an untreated
12Another important assumption is common support, that is, for any given x, both treated and
control individuals have propensity scores within the (0,1) interval.
13Other relevant empirical and methodological contributions for this particular aspect were
given by Aakvik (2001), DiPrete & Gangl (2004) and Becker & Caliendo (2007).
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individual. If the probability of treatment is assumed to follow a logistic14
distribution, expressed in terms of its cumulative distribution function
pi = F (βxi +γui ) =
1
1+ e−(βxi+γui )
(7)
where β and γ are vectors of coefficients that capture respectively the sensitiv-
ity of the probability of treatment to observed and unobserved factors.
Using equation 7 into equation 6 and rearranging leads to:
eβxi+γui
eβxj+γuj
(8)
For a pair of two matched families i and j that consequently share the
same vector of observable covariates, the odds ratio is a quantity independent
of x:
pi
1−pi
pj
1−pj
= eγ(ui−uj) (9)
The odds ratio is different from one unless the unobservable factors are
negligible to determine the probability of treatment (γ = 0) and/or the unob-
served values for both matched individuals are identical (ui = uj ), in which
case there is no hidden or covert selection bias. For example, if the odds ratio
is greater than one, a treated individual was, ex ante, more likely to receive
the treatment relative to an untreated individual even after controlling for the
observable characteristics.
We follow the literature and assume that the unobserved factor is a di-
chotomous variable: ui ∈ {0,1} and denote eγ = Γ. Rosenbaum derived the
following bounds for the odds ratio:
1
Γ
≤
pi
1−pi
pj
1−pj
≤ Γ (10)
If Γ = 1, two matched families (one treated and one untreated) with similar
propensity scores have the same probability of receiving the additional benefit
and there is no covert bias. If Γ = 2, even though two matched families share
similar observable characteristics, the family with the extra benefit was ex
ante 2 times more likely to receive the treatment when compared to a similar
family that did not receive the benefit.
If the difference between treated and untreated families is statistically sig-
nificant, even for low values of Γ, the hypothesis of covert bias affecting the re-
sults cannot be rejected. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the Rosen-
baum bounds represent a worst case scenario.
3.3 Calculating the ATT
There are several alternatives of matching methods to calculate the average
treatment on the treated (ATT), established in the program evaluation litera-
14That is the usual distribution in the literature. One of the main reasons for its use is that it
greatly simplifies the exposition.
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ture.15 We will focus on four methods of calculating the ATT: Nearest Neigh-
bour, Radius (Nearest Neighbour with more than one neighbor), Stratification
and Kernel.
The method of pairing the nearest neighbor, as the name suggests, selects
the non-treated individuals to be compared to a treated one when they have
the propensity score closest to each other. We follow the notation adopted
in the impact evaluation literature and define T to be the set of treated units
and C the set of control units, and YT and YC the results of those treated and
control, respectively. Denoting C (i) as the set of control individuals matched
with the treated individual i with an estimated propensity core pi . Thus, we
have:
C (i) =min‖pi − pj‖, i , j (11)
It is worth noting that C (i) is a singleton set unless there are multiple near-
est neighbors. The Radius estimator allows all individuals j within a certain
radius r to be controls for a treated individual i:
C (i) =
{
pj | ‖pi − pj‖ < r, i , j
}
(12)
The ATT estimator for both cases above is given by:
ATTNN = ATTR =
1
NT
∑
i∈T
YTi −
∑
j∈C(i)
wijY
C
j
 , (13)
with the corresponding C(i) for each estimator andwij =
1
NCi
if j ∈ C (i) ,wij = 0
otherwise.
The method of stratified matching is performed by dividing the variation
in the propensity scores into intervals such that each of treated and control
units have on average the same propensity score. Then, in each interval, the
difference in average scores between groups of participants and nonpartici-
pants is calculated. The ATT is finally obtained by the weighted average of
these differences, with the weights being determined by the distribution of
units between the treated blocks. In the stratified matching method, the ob-
servations in the blocks that have no treatment or control are discarded. Defin-
ing q as the index of the blocks defined in the range of propensity score within
each block is computed, we have:
ATT Sq =
∑
i∈I (q)YTi
NTq
−
∑
j∈I (q)YTi
NCq
(14)
where I (q) represents all the units in block q, while NTq and N
C
q represent the
amounts of treated and control units in block q, respectively.
The Kernel matching estimator assigns weights on each controls decreas-
ing on the distance (in terms of the propensity score) to the treated individual:
ATTK =
1
NT
∑
i∈T
YTi −
∑
j∈C Y
Cj G
(pj−pi
h
)
∑
k∈CG
(
pk−pi
h
)
 (15)
15This session is based on Becker & Ichino (2002).
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where G (·) is a kernel function and h is the bandwidth. It can be interpreted
as a particular version of the Radius method.
4 Program Participation and effects on Consumption
4.1 Additional Sample Delimitation
In the estimation of the propensity score, we need to define some variables
that are likely to explain the participation in the Bolsa Cidadão program. How-
ever, as the following analysis will show, many relevant variables would be re-
dundant, if we considered the whole sample (all individuals in all households).
In order to avoid this problem, all information from the families was grouped,
so that all individuals of one family have information that are common and
linked to each member of the family. Therefore, only the heads of each family
are kept in the data, and although information from the households is main-
tained, the problem of redundant information is overcome. Additionally, all
observations with inconsistent levels of income and consumption were dis-
carded.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6 below shows the descriptive statistics for consumption per capita and
the variables used in the estimation of the propensity score. The 57,523 obser-
vations refer to families in 41 municipalities covered by both programs. The
variables of personal attributes such as age, race and sex refer to the head of
the family. The first seven variables are continuous while the others are bi-
nary, taking 1 when they have the attribute in consideration and 0 otherwise.
Since they are dichotomous variables, the average of these variables informs
the proportion of the population in question that have the attributes. Still
from Table 6, one can see that 11,556 households receive the additional bene-
fit, which represents over 20% of households in the data.16
The households with the additional conditional cash transfer have a sta-
tistically significant higher level of consumption, even though the average
income is not statistically different. However, this 4.78% higher consumption
might be affected by observable variables. One of these variables seems to be
the amount received from the Bolsa Família program in per capita terms. The
amount paid for households with the Bolsa Cidadão program is significantly
smaller than the per capita value received by families without the additional
benefit.
Some other relevant conclusions may be taken from Table 6. More than
96% of the household heads are women. Besides, the average consumption
per capita level is almost R$ 4 higher than the average income per capita,
indicating, in general a certain degree of indebtedness.17
Figure 1 depicts the distribution of income and consumption per capita,
letting clear the high degree of inequality among the poor and that almost the
whole of both distributions are below R$ 100 per month per capita. Another
relevant characteristic is the fact the consumption distribution is considerably
16Note that the difference between this number and presented in section 2 is due to the restric-
tions made in the sample.
17It is important to highlight that the income in this analysis does not include the cash trans-
fers.
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Bolsa Cidadão and Bolsa Família
Recipients
Bolsa Família only
Mean S. Dev. Min Max Mean S. Dev. Min Max
Consumption per Capita 39.07 23.19 1.43 258 37.25 23.11 1.01 286
Income per Capita 34.68 28.97 0 380 34.69 27.30 0 380
Bolsa Família per capita 21.67 8.84 1.8 76 22.02 9.38 1.64 116
Age 37.22 10.90 17 94 37.48 11.07 16 92
Number of People in HH 4.30 1.78 1 15 4.26 1.77 1 16
Number of Rooms in HH 4.71 1.64 1 16 4.66 1.61 1 19
Male 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.04 0.19 0 1
Non-white 0.77 0.42 0 1 0.74 0.44 0 1
Married 0.73 0.44 0 1 0.72 0.45 0 1
Unemployed 0.31 0.46 0 1 0.34 0.47 0 1
Elementary School 0.15 0.36 0 1 0.15 0.36 0 1
High School 0.07 0.26 0 1 0.08 0.26 0 1
Urban 0.35 0.48 0 1 0.35 0.48 0 1
Brick Household 0.76 0.43 0 1 0.77 0.42 0 1
Appropriate Sewer 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.25 0.44 0 1
Crop Insurance Recipient 0.13 0.34 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Number of Observations 11,556 45,967
Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
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Figure 1: Distribution of Consumption and Income per capita
smoother than the income distribution, revealing a greater inconsistence in
the declaration of the monthly amount of income.
4.3 Propensity Score Estimation
As discussed above, even with the comparison of two extremely similar groups,
it is still possible that there is selection bias. In order to mitigate this problem,
the propensity score model is estimated and presented in Table 7. The specifi-
cation of the model that determines the likelihood of receiving the additional
benefit was obtained, as usual, by observing the balancing property for all co-
variates. The use of a less parsimonious model is justified by the fact that the
greater the number of variables included, the better the matching performed,
since the higher the number of observable characteristics used, the more sim-
ilar are the individuals in the treatment and control groups.18
In the estimated model, most control variables are statistically significant
and have the expected effects, what suggests that the included factors are rele-
vant to determine treatment. It is observed that the number of children in the
household increases the likelihood of participation in the Bolsa Cidadão pro-
gram. The fact that the head of household is unemployed, male or white de-
creases this probability. Married individuals, located in urban areas, in house-
holds with greater numbers of rooms are more likely to be eligible for the
program. In addition, households made of brick are less likely to be selected,
while families who participate in the Crop Insurance program are more likely
to receive the Bolsa Cidadão benefit.
18Interactions between the variables are also included in the specification, but are omitted in
the table.
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Table 7: Propensity Score Estimation — Bolsa Cidadão Recipient
Coeff. Std. Error t-test p-value
Constant −1.7292 0.2602 −6.65 0.000
Male −0.5065 0.1435 −3.53 0.000
Non-white 0.0047 0.0599 0.08 0.938
Age 0.0666 0.0124 5.35 0.000
Age2 −0.0019 0.0003 −6.50 0.000
Married 0.1452 0.0154 9.41 0.000
Income in the HH per Capita −0.0052 0.0013 −3.90 0.000
Bolsa Família per capita −0.0001 0.0010 −0.06 0.951
Unemployed −0.1174 0.0137 −8.58 0.000
Elementary School 0.0366 0.0241 1.52 0.128
High School −0.0549 0.0318 −1.73 0.084
Number of People in the HH 0.0021 0.0038 0.57 0.570
Number of Rooms 0.0054 0.0331 0.16 0.869
Urban 0.0253 0.0139 1.83 0.067
Brick Household −0.1135 0.0723 −1.57 0.116
Appropriate Sewer in the HH −0.0744 0.0636 −1.17 0.243
Crop Insurance Recipient −0.0172 0.0278 −0.62 0.535
Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
Figure 2 shows the nonparametric distribution of the propensity score
comparing control and treatment groups. Interestingly, the distribution for
treated and control groups do not differ significantly, as one might expect.
This is likely due to the fact that we are only considering Bolsa Família recipi-
ents, what makes most households in our sample very homogeneous. Yet, we
could expect significant differences if the supplementary program had prior-
itized a specific group of families. This evidence strongly suggests that the
choice of the Bolsa Cidadão recipients was reasonably random among the fam-
ilies participating in the Bolsa Família program.
4.4 Estimation of Impact of a higher value of Bolsa Família on
Consumption
Table 8 shows the estimates of the impact of Bolsa Cidadão benefit on the
consumption per capita for the 41 non-contiguous municipalities using the
estimated propensity score and the four matching methods described in the
previous section: nearest neighbor, radius, stratification and kernel matching,
with the nearest neighbor estimates being reported for 1 and 2 neighbours. In
general, it is possible to identify a positive and statistically significant effect
on consumption, if the family receives the additional cash transfer, which is
around R$ 2.00 per month.19
The first part of the table displays the results of estimating the average
treatment effect on the treated using matching by stratification method. To
match the 11,556 families that received the additional benefit were generated
45,966 control families, with an ATT of 2.235.
19The estimate of the ATT is performed considering the use of common support for all obser-
vations and all standard error estimates are bootstrapped.
The Impact on Consumption of More Cash 571
0
2
4
6
8
k
d
e
n
s
it
y
_
p
s
c
o
re
0 .2 .4 .6 .8
x
Treated Control
Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
Figure 2: Propensity Score: Treated vs Control
In order to test the robustness of this result, the ATT was estimated by the
method of matching of nearest neighbor with one and two neighbors. Like
the stratification method estimate, the impact of the additional cash transfer
in the estimates based on the nearest neighbor method is positive, significant
and around R$ 2.00.20
Table 8: ATT Estimate: Nearest Neighbor, Radius, Stratification and
Kernel Matching
Matching
Method
Number of
Treated
Number of
Controls
ATT Standard
Error
t-test Covert Bias
Bounds (Γ)
Stratification 11,556 45,966 2.235 0.225 9.95 1.10− 1.15
Nearest Neighbor
(One neighbor)
11,556 45,966 2.194 0.345 6.35 1.15− 1.20
Nearest Neighbor
(Two neighbors)
11,556 45,966 1.966 0.294 6.67 1.03− 1.04
Radius 11,352 44,516 2.239 0.248 9.02 1.02− 1.03
(caliper=0.0001)
Kernel 11,556 45,958 1.739 0.245 7.09 1.02− 1.03
Note: The number of treated and controls refers to the effectively matched by the
corresponding matching method. Bootstrapped standard errors.
Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
The last two matching methods are the radius and kernel, generating ATTs
of 2.239 and 1.739, respectively. Note that because of the restriction in the size
of the radius, the number of treated and controls in the radius method were
11,352 and 44,516, respectively.
20The results do not change substantially when other matching methods were used, namely
Radius Matching and Kernel Matching.
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The increase in consumption varies from 4.67% (kernel) to 6.01% (strat-
ification) when compared with the households that receive only the Bolsa
Família benefit. Except for the kernel estimate, these figures are marginally
higher than the 4.78% observed by themean comparison, which would corrob-
orate with the fact that poorer households are selected to the additional pro-
gram. These numbers are also consistent with the fact that the Bolsa Cidadão
program represents an income increase of 7.12% in the household per capita
income.
Nevertheless, the narrow gap between the estimated ATTs and the differ-
ence between the treated and control before matching casts some doubt on
the assumption that there was a selection to receive the Bolsa Cidadão benefit,
based on observed characteristics of the families, like the level of income. This
is despite the fact that there was considerable bias reduction after matching
for all matching methods used, presented in Table A.1 in the appendix. The
reduction in the mean absolute standardized bias between the matched and
unmatched families varies between 73.4 and 86.2.
In order to consider the importance of the influence of unobserved factors,
Table 8 also presents the sensibility of the results to the presence of covert
bias, displaying the critical levels of Γ described in section 3.2. The small
values indicate that unobserved factors, such as the fact that a family knows
someone in the municipal administration, can play an important role in the
results. Covert bias is a likely possibility as the critical levels of Γ in which the
conclusion of an effect of the additional benefit is as little as 2% in the case
of the radius and kernel matching methods and 20% in the nearest neighbor
with one control for each treated unit.
Nevertheless, it must be taken into account that such sensitivity analysis
represents a worst case scenario. DiPrete & Gangl (2004) emphasize that even
in the cases in which the critical levels of Γ are very small, the ATT estimates
would be inconsistent only if unobserved factors caused the odds ratio of treat-
ment to differ between treatment and control groups by a small factor and
if the effects of those confounding factors on the outcome variable were ex-
tremely strong. In the present case, if the confounding factors had a relevant
effect on the likelihood of receiving the additional benefit but little influence
on consumption levels, the ATT estimates would still be consistent.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents an analysis of the impact of an increase in the Bolsa
Família program on the consumption of households by using a unique data
set in Brazil. This was possible by comparing households that are recipients
of both Bolsa Família and Bolsa Cidadão programswith households that receive
only the former.
The methodology of matching based on propensity score is used in order
to mitigate the selection bias in the determination of the recipients of the ad-
ditional benefit. It was observed a statistically significant average increase on
household consumption for those receiving the additional cash transfer bene-
fit. This is in line with the percentage increase in income from the additional
benefit. The analysis also showed that the additional benefit was concentrated
in the poorer households, what helps to reduce the income inequality among
the poor.
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Nevertheless, a sensitivity analysis pointed out the possibility that unob-
served factors could be driving the results. Moreover, as the marginal propen-
sity to consume is assumed to be closer to one when we consider lower quan-
tiles, one might expect a higher increase in the consumption. This could be re-
lated to a measurement error in the consumption basket referenced in Cadas-
tro Único database, since the information is self-reported. This misreporting
could be largely related to the fact that part of the extra resources generates
an income effect that boosts the purchase of durable goods, which are gen-
erally paid in monthly installments, which people tend not to recognize as
consumption.
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Appendix A
Table A.1: Situation in the Labor Market of the
population in the database in working age
Matching Method Mean Bias | ∆ Bias |%
Stratification 0.72 73.4
Nearest Neighbor (1) 0.81 77.3
Nearest Neighbor (2) 0.78 78.0
Radius 0.49 86.2
Kernel 0.54 84.6
Raw Sample Mean Bias: 3.56.
Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
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Table A.2: Values and percentages of the benefits: Bolsa Cidadão X
Bolsa Família
Bolsa Cidadão
0 5 10 15 20 25 Total %
BF
0 558664 145 445 270 105 58 559687 0.808
18 4234 556 237 344 75 12 5458 0.008
23 1 - - - - - 1 0
26 115 77 11 3 1 - 207 0
36 2670 82 361 123 173 43 3452 0.005
38 1 - - - - - 1 0
41 6 - 6 - - 1 13 0
44 29 - 21 4 - 1 55 0
51 2 - - - - - 2 0
54 1279 11 23 153 38 118 1622 0.002
58 18472 29 3464 640 56 7 22668 0.033
59 3 - - 2 - - 5 0
61 5 - - - - - 5 0
62 7 - - 3 - - 10 0
64 1 - - - - - 1 0
66 34 - - 1 - - 35 0
72 2 - - 1 - - 3 0
76 29421 524 1113 4432 732 76 36298 0.052
77 2 - - - - - 2 0
79 1 - - 1 - - 2 0
81 3 - - - 1 - 4 0
84 287 7 2 122 22 2 442 0.001
91 2 - - - 1 - 3 0
94 25382 18 533 1346 2569 574 30586 0.044
96 1 - - - - - 1 0
97 2 - - - - - 2 0
99 44 - - - 9 1 54 0
102 155 - 2 - 54 9 220 0
108 4 - - - - - 4 0
112 24943 48 180 518 759 4481 30929 0.045
114 7 - - - - 1 8 0
115 4 - - - - - 4 0
116 22 - 3 - 1 - 26 0
117 29 - - - - 6 35 0
119 1 - - - - - 1 0
120 206 - - - - 112 318 0
127 2 - - - - - 2 0
134 3 - 1 1 - - 5 0
135 123 - - - - 35 158 0
142 1 - - - - - 1 0
150 41 - - - - 12 53 0
152 16 - - - - - 16 0
155 2 - - - - - 2 0
165 7 - - - - - 7 0
166 - - - 1 - - 1 0
188 18 - - - 1 - 19 0
224 14 - - - - - 14 0
240 1 - - - - - 1 0
Note: Information in November — 2007. Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
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Table A.3: Municipalities with Bolsa Cidadão recipients and participa-
tion in the programs
Municipality Total Popu-
lation
Cadastro
Único
% Bolsa
Família
% Bolsa
Cidadão
%
Aiuaba 15500 11471 0.74 9877 0.861 677 0.059
Alcantaras 10349 7950 0.768 6522 0.82 1932 0.243
Apuiares 15111 8675 0.574 8063 0.929 523 0.06
Araripe 21474 21755 1.013 14585 0.67 4191 0.193
Arneiroz 7666 5785 0.755 4819 0.833 1110 0.192
Assare 21964 18062 0.822 13960 0.773 1432 0.079
Aurora 25816 19318 0.748 16654 0.862 1532 0.079
Barroquinha 14765 12515 0.848 9915 0.792 4138 0.331
Boa Viagem 52337 41158 0.786 33582 0.816 5074 0.123
Carire 19357 13540 0.699 11981 0.885 557 0.041
Caririacu 29487 23330 0.791 19130 0.82 7716 0.331
Carius 19186 15190 0.792 12756 0.84 1522 0.1
Catarina 18619 8133 0.437 7219 0.888 1846 0.227
Chaval 13526 10513 0.777 8407 0.8 849 0.081
Coreau 22035 16107 0.731 14116 0.876 1648 0.102
Farias Brito 22602 17199 0.761 13211 0.768 1709 0.099
Graca 15194 12316 0.811 10491 0.852 2011 0.163
Granja 54422 37826 0.695 32057 0.847 7740 0.205
Hidrolandia 17506 14570 0.832 12493 0.857 1073 0.074
Iraucuba 21605 18138 0.84 14704 0.811 6254 0.345
Itatira 16976 17596 1.036 12491 0.71 6632 0.377
Jardim 28497 21666 0.76 17814 0.822 972 0.045
Madalena 16738 14200 0.848 9853 0.694 1014 0.071
Massape 34578 26346 0.762 19532 0.741 2613 0.099
Miraima 12578 9462 0.752 7804 0.825 798 0.084
Mombaca 41540 33118 0.797 26784 0.809 1400 0.042
Moraujo 7704 6199 0.805 5266 0.849 1232 0.199
Morrinhos 20821 12978 0.623 11633 0.896 713 0.055
Mucambo 15392 11066 0.719 9033 0.816 902 0.082
Ocara 23077 17608 0.763 15076 0.856 6413 0.364
Parambu 34192 27918 0.816 22163 0.794 5860 0.21
Potengi 9980 6988 0.7 5761 0.824 1536 0.22
Quiterianopolis 19214 16414 0.854 13198 0.804 5283 0.322
Reriutaba 24557 15057 0.613 12556 0.834 1416 0.094
Saboeiro 16877 12642 0.749 10793 0.854 1525 0.121
Salitre 15013 15660 1.043 11244 0.718 4134 0.264
Santana do Acarau 29388 24103 0.82 18456 0.766 2005 0.083
Tarrafas 8448 7305 0.865 6361 0.871 2028 0.278
Tejucuoca 14977 10143 0.677 8745 0.862 649 0.064
Uruoca 12550 9349 0.745 8077 0.864 2001 0.214
Vicosa do Ceará 49306 43076 0.874 32710 0.759 6953 0.161
Total 890926 692445 0.777 559892 0.809 109613 0.158
Note: Information in November — 2007. Data Source: Cadunico/MDS.
